![]() ![]() Connelly still couldn’t see the enemy fighters but he noticed that on its right Gipsy 202 fired a Sparrow and at the same time Cook III called “ Tally-ho, eleven o’ clock high. In this way, at 12:01:20 the two F-14s turned back into the bogeys and Enwright fired a second Sparrow. At a range of exactly 12.9 miles Enwright aboard Gipsy 207 fired a Sparrow missile and Connelly executed thirty degree turn to the left while Cook III onboard Gipsy 204 performed the same maneuver to the right. ![]() This radio call caused some misunderstanding since it was interpreted that the F-14s were not cleared to fire, but a “yellow, weapons hold” is used to alert the fighters that there is a possible threat to the battle group (warning yellow), and weapons hold reminds that peacetime ROE (Rules Of Engagement) still apply and the fighters must assess hostile intent or threat, or act in self defense in order to shoot.Īt 12:00:53 Enwright reported that bogies had jinked at him for the fifth time and that the Libyans were inside of twenty miles: at this point he directed the section to turn “on” the master armament switches. The air warfare commander on Kennedy transmitted to the two Swordsmen crews the coded signal “ Warning yellow, weapons hold, I repeat, warning yellow, weapons hold”. Less than one minute later, at 11:59:16 the Libyans, controlled by their own ground controlled radar, had already turned back towards the Tomcats with a closure speed of about one thousand knots. To avoid a head-on engagement with the enemy aircraft armed with radar guided air to air missiles, the F-14s turned a second time trying to offset themselves from the bogeys, hoping to gain a tactical advantage. Gillcrist in his book Tomcat! The Grumman F-14 Story.Īt 11:58:43 the US fighters leveled off at 3,000 feet and 475 knots, while the bogies were closing on a collision course at a range of 53 miles and descending. What nobody could know, was that in a matter of few minutes the events that had started as an almost normal close encounter would turn into a real air to air combat, as reported by the Rear Admiral Paul t. The two F-14s performed also a thirty degrees turn away from the enemy fighters but the bogeys countered it with a turn which placed them in a fast collision course against the Tomcats.īut the turn executed by the American fighters also to put the F-14s between the bogeys and the aircraft carrier, giving to the Tomcats an advantage position to provide protection to the USS Kennedy. ![]() The Tomcats began the engagement at 20,000 feet descending toward the bogeys that were descending from 10,000 to 8,000 feet. Several times this was enough to persuade them to turn away, but this time the bogeys kept coming. After being refueled by a KA-6D Intruder, the two F-14s with “Gipsy 207” leading the section, returned to their CAP station, when the Hawkeye, call sign “Closeout”, warned them that two Libyan aircraft had taken off from Al Bumbah airfield.Īlmost immediately, the contact was picked up by the Tomcats radars at a distance of about 72 miles and locked up: this procedure was aimed at alerting the Libyan fighters that they were monitored by armed F-14s. The two F-14s were armed with four Sparrows and two Sidewinders, since they were launched before the intended loadout of four AIM-7s and four AIM-9s was complete. Cook III and Lieutenant Commander Steven P. 159437, call sign “Gipsy 202″ crewed by Lieutenant Hermon C. Enwright as Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) and the BuNo. 159610, call sign “Gipsy 207” flown by Swordsmen skipper Commander Joseph B. ![]() 4, 1989, in the morning, four pairs of F-14s, two of those belonging to the VF-14 Tophatters and two with the VF-32 Swordsmen, were flying Combat Air Patrols (CAP) close to the Gulf of Sidra, while a single E-2C from the VAW-126 Sea Hawks supported them.įor several years, due to terrorist concerns, the crews had to remain anonymous and their names withheld from reports, but today we know that the two VF-32 Tomcats on the southernmost CAP station, were the BuNo. Kennedy (CV-67) and its battle group were dispatched to conduct a “freedom of navigation” exercise off the Libyan coast. In response to Gaddafi’s menace, the USS John F. against interfering in Libyan affairs, reiterating the threat of military actions. In fact the United States government accused Libya of building a chemical weapons plant near the town of Rabta and once again Gaddafi warned the U.S. high priority agenda.īut in late 1988, tensions between Washington and Tripoli raised again. 15, 1986, against Libya, Colonel Gaddafi and its regime went off the U.S. 19, 1981 and, above all, after Operation El Dorado Canyon, the air strike launched on Apr. After two F-14 Tomcats from the VF-41 Black Aces shot down two Su-22 Fitters on Aug. ![]()
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